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Case Note 
Pollentine v Bleijie: Kable in Pieces 
Hannah Solomons 
Abstract 
This case note reviews Pollentine v Bleijie, the first case in which the High 
Court of Australia upheld the constitutional validity of preventative detention 
without any regular judicial review or express safeguards. The Court’s ruling 
was based on a narrow interpretation of the empowering statute, in which the 
majority implied constraints far beyond what was expressly stated. This 
interpretation was then used to dismiss challenges based on the Kable principle. 
It is argued that, while a narrow interpretation of such statutes is appropriate, it 
should have been given a more clearly principled basis. Moreover, the 
treatment of Kable should also have been more clearly related to its principled 
and practical constitutional foundations in the relationship between the 
branches of government. 
I Introduction 
In 1984, Edward Pollentine and Errol Radan were sentenced to prison without a 
release date. The sentence for each was detention ‘until the Governor in Council is 
satisfied on the report of two medical practitioners that it is expedient to release’.1 
Three decades later, both men are still in prison. In Pollentine v Bleijie,2 the High 
Court of Australia unanimously affirmed the validity of the scheme that keeps 
them there. 
All jurisdictions except the Australian Capital Territory and New South 
Wales have some provision for indefinite detention orders at the time of sentence.3 
However, only the Queensland and Western Australian legislation leave the release 
date entirely up to the executive branch of government.4 Until the High Court’s 
decision in Pollentine v Bleijie,5 the constitutional validity of such schemes had 
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1 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1945 (Qld) s 18(5). 
2 (2014) 253 CLR 629. 
3 For an excellent summary of preventative sentencing laws in Australia, see Bernadette McSherry, 
Patrick Keyzer and Arie Frieberg, ‘Preventive Detention for “Dangerous” Offenders in Australia:  
A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Policy Development’ (Report to the Criminology Research 
Council, Australian Institute of Criminology, December 2006) 18. 
4 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 98; Criminal Law Amendment Act 1945 (Qld) s 18. 
5 (2014) 253 CLR 629. 
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only been assumed.6 It has now been expressly established, but only on the basis of 
a very specific construction of the empowering statute, and a fragmented 
application of the Kable principle.7 
II Background 
The challenged scheme is contained in s 18 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
1945 (Qld). It applies to those convicted of any sexual offence involving a child 
aged under 16 years.8 After both plaintiffs pleaded guilty to such offences,9 it 
empowered the sentencing judges to call for sworn reports from two medical 
practitioners as to whether each offender’s ‘mental condition is such that the 
offender is incapable of exercising proper control over the offender’s sexual 
instincts’.10 Because both practitioners reported in the affirmative, the sentencing 
judges could, and did, find such incapacity proven. Having done so, they were then 
empowered to order detention during Her Majesty’s pleasure.11 
Since such orders can be ‘in addition to or in lieu of any other sentence’,12 
Mr Radan was also given a numbered sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment.13 After 
10 years of an entirely indeterminate sentence, Mr Pollentine requested judicial 
review of a refusal to release him. Reconsideration was ordered, due to violation of 
an implied right to procedural fairness,14 but the refusal was reaffirmed.15 




6 The closest to a de facto endorsement was probably the refusal of special leave to appeal, on this 
and other grounds, in Yarran v R [2004] HCATrans 417 (27 October 2004). The frequently-cited 
obiter dicta in Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465, 495 specifically recommended periodic court 
orders and safeguards of a type similar to Fardon v A-G (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575 (‘Fardon’). 
There have also been two cases since Kable where it was unnecessary to decide the validity of 
Western Australian laws because sentences were overturned on other grounds: Yates v R (2013) 
247 CLR 328; McGarry v R (2001) 207 CLR 121. 
7 The principle regarding invalidity of state laws that violate the institutional integrity of state courts 
exercising Commonwealth jurisdiction, derived originally from Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 
CLR 51 (‘Kable’). 
8 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1945 (Qld) s 18(1). 
9 For details of each man’s offences, see Pollentine No 1 [1995] 2 Qd R 412, 53–4; R v Radan [1984] 
2 Qd R 554, 554. 
10 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1945 (Qld) s 18(1)(a). 
11 Ibid s 18(3). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Mr Radan’s numbered sentence was reduced to three years’ imprisonment, with the Queensland 
Court of Criminal Appeal unanimously agreeing that the ‘reformatory’ indefinite sentence should 
begin as soon as possible: R v Radan [1984] 2 Qd R 554, 557. 
14 Pollentine No 1 [1995] 2 Qd R 412. 
15 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 641 [14]. 
16 Pollentine v A-G (Qld) (1996) 88 A Crim R 146, 147. 
17 Pollentine v A-G (Qld) [1998] 1 Qd R 82 (‘Pollentine No 2’). 
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III The Judgment 
The question before the High Court was framed as whether s 18 of the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 1945 (Qld) violated ch III of the Australian Constitution, 
whether by virtue of the Kable principle, or otherwise.18 Two judgments were 
given: one joint judgment,19 and one by Gageler J.20 Both focused on three specific 
possible violations of the Kable principle. Before dismissing each of these in turn, 
the Court explored the meaning of the statutory criteria. 
A Step 1: The Interpretative Foundation 
For the High Court, the key provision to construe was s 18(5)(b) of the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 1945 (Qld),21 which provides the only guidance regarding 
when to release an offender, namely when ‘the Governor in Council is satisfied on 
the report of 2 medical practitioners that it is expedient’. Despite the apparent 
range and flexibility of meanings for ‘expedient’,22 both judgments were adamant 
that the section did not confer ‘unfettered discretion’23 on the executive, but, rather, 
imposed criteria closely related to those used by the sentencing judge. In fact, the 
joint reasons found ‘no relevant differences’ between the criteria for the executive 
and the judicial processes.24 Their Honours stated that ‘[w]hat is “expedient” turns 
only on whether the detainee remains incapable of exercising proper control’.25 
This, in turn, was defined as a predictive question regarding what offences they 
might commit and the likelihood that they would do so.26 This interpretation was 
said to be founded on the legislative purpose and context.27 
Justice Gageler’s judgment was markedly different. Citing South Australia 
v O’Shea28 and Pollentine No 2,29 he argued that since risk was a matter of degree, 
being judged by a political body, the executive should ask what degree of risk is 
‘acceptable’, taking into account public opinion.30 However, the other judges 
																																																								
18 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 658–9. 
19 Ibid 638–51. 
20 Ibid 652–9. 
21 The plaintiffs raised numerous construction concerns regarding the criteria and standards used by 
courts in engaging the scheme. These are outlined clearly in Edward Pollentine and George Radan, 
‘Plaintiffs’ Submissions’, Submission in Pollentine v Bleijie, No B39 of 2013, 17 April 2014, 9, 
11–13 and discussed in the Transcript of Proceedings, Pollentine v Bleijie [2014] HCATrans 124 
(17 June 2014) 465–620. However, these were all dismissed as matters for resolution in other cases 
and, in particular, as irrelevant to invalidity, or not in dispute. Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) (2014) 
253 CLR 629, 645 [27], 646 [30], 651 [50]. 
22 Transcript of Proceedings, Pollentine v Bleijie [2014] HCATrans 124 (17 June 2014) 2655  
(P J Dunning QC), 3440–48 (S P Donoghue QC). 
23 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 646–7 [34]; Gageler J used the term ‘unconstrained 
power’ at 657–8 [74]–[75]. 
24 Ibid 648 [39]. 
25 Ibid 646–7 [34]. 
26 Ibid 647 [36]. 
27 Ibid 647–8 [37]. 
28 (1987) 163 CLR 378. 
29 Pollentine No 2 [1998] 1 Qd R 82 (‘’). 
30 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 657–8 [75]. His argument was nuanced, and he did 
dismiss any other type of political considerations. 
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strongly emphasised that the criteria for release were apolitical, and factoring in 
anything but the narrowest predictive considerations would be a ‘legal error’.31 
Their Honours felt determined that because the satisfaction was to be ‘on’ medical 
reports, considerations should focus exclusively on the question those reports 
answered, even possibly on the reports alone.32 They did feel thatTheir Honours 
viewed the words ‘unacceptable risk’ in the criteria for parole were as relevant, 
because parole formed a complementary part of the scheme,33 but they said 
precisely how was ‘not necessary to explore’, and returned to their main point 
about no relevant differences.34 By contrast, the difference identified by Gageler J 
could hardly be considered irrelevant or insignificant, so for his Honour the 
executive and judicial decisions were complementary.35 
B Step 2: The Kable Arguments 
Their Honours used their narrow construction of executive power to dismiss each 
of the proposed Kable violations with increasing brevity. They cited Fardon v 
Attorney-General (Qld)36 in defining the principle as a lack of power to confer 
upon state courts functions that are repugnant to or incompatible with ‘the 
institutional integrity ... which bespeaks their constitutionally mandated position in 
the Australian legal system’.37 It is necessary to refer to the plaintiffs’ submissions 
to understand their Honours’ reasoning here. Below, I consider each Kable 
argument in turn. 
1 The Delegation Issue 
The plaintiffs submitted that too much of what should be judicial functions were 
being delegated to the executive. Their counsel presented several cases from the 
United Kingdom in which it had been found that while life sentences are 
determined by the courts, indefinite sentences are set by the executive.38 These 
included some Privy Council decisions overturning indefinite sentences in 
countries with a constitutional separation of powers.39 The plaintiffs’ counsel then 
attempted to draw this together with Australian jurisprudence by arguing that this 
was preventative detention at the pleasure of the executive and so separated 
involuntary detention from the judicial function, determination of guilt, and 
sentencing.40 They relied upon a line of cases beginning with Lim,41 which had 
established a rule that involuntary detention by the state should be a concomitant of 
																																																								
31 Ibid 647 [36]. 
32 Ibid 646–7 [34]. 
33 Ibid 647–8 [37]. 
34 Ibid 648 [38]–[39]. 
35 Ibid 657–8 [75]. 
36 (2004) 223 CLR 575. 
37 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 648–9 [42], quoting Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 617 
[101]. 
38 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407. 
39 Hinds v R [1977] AC 195; Browne v R [2000] 1 AC 45; DPP Jamaica v Mollison [2003] 2 AC 411. 
40 Transcript of Proceedings, Pollentine v Bleijie [2014] HCATrans 124 (17 June 2014) 1755–64. 
41 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 
1 (‘Lim’). 
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the ‘exclusively judicial function’ of ‘adjudgment and punishment of criminal 
guilt’, with only carefully limited and well justified exceptions.42 Participation in 
such a violation of the principles governing its own functions, it was argued, could 
not be compatible with a court’s institutional integrity. 
Justice Gageler’s judgment is a much clearer response to these principles. 
His Honour distinguishes two types of indefinite detention: the type in the United 
Kingdom cases, he reasons, was punitive in character. However, the detention in 
Pollentine v Bleijie is of a different type, with the executive and judiciary playing 
‘complementary’ roles in a ‘purely preventative and therapeutic’43 exercise. His 
Honour claims that this has been a permissible type of detention, and it has been 
permissible to incorporate it into the judicial conviction and sentencing exercise 
since the Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800.44 He therefore concludes that the 
Queensland scheme falls within one of the classic exceptions recognised in Lim.45 
The joint judgment does not mention Lim at all, probably because, for their 
Honours, the features that marked this off from ordinary judicial processes were 
minimal. They saw the orders as serving the normal range of sentencing purposes 
and as depending on the normal methods for judicial decision-making.46 That the 
decision is discretionary, not mandatory, was sufficient to distinguish Pollentine v 
Bleijie, in their eyes, from all the United Kingdom jurisprudence,47 freeing them to 
focus on the question of whether there was a ‘feature’ that points to 
‘repugnancy’.48 Their Honours found none in the judicial decision-making process, 
and in the executive process they found quite the opposite. Their interpretation of 
s 18(5)(b), they reasoned, meant that it is entirely free from any retributive 
considerations, and therefore the executive cannot be performing any of the 
functions associated with the determination and punishment of criminal guilt.49 
Their Honours then noted that this, combined with the reliance on ‘mental 
condition’ in s 18(5)(1), was reminiscent of court powers over the unfit to plead or 
criminally insane.50 The degree and significance of the similarity is not, however, 
made explicit. It seems sufficient for their Honours to note that this division of 




42 Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27. This case was used by four judges in the original case of Kable (1996) 
189 CLR 51, 61–2, 87–8, 97–8, 131–2. It was also applied and developed in key challenges to court 
preventative and detention powers in Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 611–12, 654–5 and Thomas v 
Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307. The best summary and discussion of the principle is found in 
Gummow J’s judgment in Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 611–13. 
43 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 656–7 [72] quoting R v Secretary of State for Home 
Department; Ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407, 514. 
44 40 George 3, c 94; Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 656–7 [71]–[73]. 
45 Ibid 656 [70]. 
46 Ibid 649–50 [44]. 
47 Ibid 649 [44] n 78.  
48 Ibid 649–70 [44]. 
49 Ibid 650 [45]. 
50 Ibid. 
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2 The Cloaking Argument 
The second argument rejected by their Honours was that the executive had so 
much authority under s 18(5)(b), ostensibly on the basis of a court order, that the 
‘neutral colors [sic] of judicial action’ became a ‘cloak’ for the executive’s 
political actions.51 Both judgments found that the executive’s power was 
sufficiently constrained to render its decision-making of a different type to that 
contemplated in that metaphor.52 Their Honours stated, ‘the decision to release a 
detainee is not properly described as a “political decision”’.53 Further, they 
emphasised that the decision ‘is to be made according to a criterion which admits 
of judicial review’.54 The joint judgment also reasoned that there was no cloaking, 
because the decisions that the executive makes are clearly seen to be made by 
non-judicial bodies.55 
3 The Safeguards Argument 
The final possibility canvassed by the plaintiffs was that a court’s involvement in 
this kind of detention might be permissible, but only with sufficient safeguards, 
which are not present in s 18.56 Both judgments focused on the plaintiffs’ 
complaints about the absence of the regular reviews by the courts. Such reviews 
were central to the indefinite detention regimes approved in Fardon and R v 
Moffatt.57 However, the joint judgment simply pointed to their Honours’ reasoning, 
which established that authorising the executive to determine the end of an 
indefinite sentence is acceptable.58 Justice Gageler cited the availability of judicial 
review as a sufficient answer to the problem.59 
IV Critical Analysis 
A Interpretation 
The joint judgment’s extremely narrow interpretation seems difficult to sustain on 
the expressly stated bases alone, especially given the failure to engage with the 
careful arguments that were accepted by Gageler J.60 However, their Honours’ 
																																																								
51 Ibid 650 [46], citing Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 615 [91]. This metaphor originates in the case of 
Mistretta v United States 488 US 361, 407, but it was used by two other judges in Fardon (2004) 
223 CLR 575, 602 [44] (McHugh J), 615 [91] (Gummow J). It also received a strong endorsement 
in A-G (NT) v Emmerson (2014) 253 CLR 393, 425 [41]. 
52 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 650 [47], 657–8 [75]. 
53 Ibid 650 [47]. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid 650–51 [48]. 
56 Ibid 658 [76]; Transcript of Proceedings, Pollentine v Bleijie [2014] HCATrans 124 (17 June 2014) 
2045–59. 
57 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 805 [51], 809 [76]; R v Moffatt [1998] 2 VR 229 
(‘Moffatt’). 
58 Ibid 651 [51]. 
59 Ibid 658 [76]. 
60 Ibid 654–55 [67]. 
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reasoning is immediately preceded by an acknowledgement of valid concerns 
about ‘administrative arbitrariness’ and a statement that the risk thereof depends 
‘first and foremost upon [the Act’s] proper construction’.61 Liberty is considered 
‘the most basic’ of common law rights.62 Avoiding arbitrariness in its removal is a 
key element of that right.63 The European Court of Human Rights found that 
detention could become arbitrary if it was not assessed and limited according to 
specific objectives for which detention was acceptable, and if this was not the case 
at every point when decisions about it were made.64 The United Nations has also 
expressed concerns about differences between the reasons and procedures for the 
initial deprivation of liberty and its continuation in Australian preventative 
detention regimes.65 The deliberate implication of strictly limiting criteria 
paralleling the enabling judicial decisions is, therefore, a welcome and appropriate 
approach to construction of executive powers over indefinite detention. 
Unfortunately, their Honours did not place this important human rights 
issue in any principled framework. Using the extremely strong legality 
presumption surrounding detention,66 or the assumption that legislation is 
harmonious and coherent,67 would have been more defensible and set up a practical 
basis for human rights protection in the future. The significance of arbitrariness for 
validity was also never clarified, because the chosen construction was never the 
sole reason for defeating any argument. Similar observations can be made about 
the protection offered by judicial review.68 The joint judgment treats both things as 
one positive among other positives, a ‘feature’ that ‘points’ away from 
‘repugnancy’, but not conclusively. 
B The High Court’s Approach to Kable 
This focus on ‘features’ appears to be the hallmark of the approach in the joint 
judgment. While Gageler J’s focus is on the ‘complementarity’ between the 
executive and legislative powers in performing an ultimate function,69 the joint 
judgment deals with each exercise of power as a feature in isolation. It seems very 
strange, for example, that a court order, made following normal judicial processes 
and authorising detention for normal sentencing purposes,70 can be transformed 
																																																								
61 Ibid 643–4 [22]. 
62 Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 [19]. 
63 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 9(1); Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 
(entered into force 3 September 1953), art 5(1), as interpreted in James v United Kingdom [2012] 
ECHR 1706. 
64 James v United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 1706, [194]. 
65 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 1629/2007, 98th sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/98/D/1629/2007 (26 March 2007, adopted 18 March 2010) (Fardon v Australia) 7.4(3). 
66 See Chief Justice Spigelman, ‘The Principles of Legality and Clear Statement of Principle’ (Speech 
delivered at New South Wales Bar Association Conference, Sydney, 18 March 2005) 25–6. 
67 Plaintiff S4/2014 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 312 ALR 537, 546 [42]. 
68 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 650–51 [46]–[49]. 
69 Ibid 657–8 [75]–[76]. 
70 Ibid 649–50 [43]–[44]. 
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into a purely preventative matter when the executive continues it.71 However, this 
position can be maintained if specific, process-based, features of each stage are 
considered in isolation. Such an approach means there is no cloaking if there is no 
single event where the judicial process and executive decision-making unite.72 For 
the majority, judicial review is relevant to whether executive decisions are 
political, because everything is assessed as a feature of how one type of power is 
exercised. For Gageler J, it is relevant to comparisons of safeguards in different 
regimes, because those safeguards are interpreted as aspects of a functional 
relationship. In direct contrast, for the majority, they are seen as retentions of 
power by one branch.73 
There are numerous problems with the joint approach. International 
jurisprudence suggests that transforming a person’s sentence from one type or 
basis to another can itself constitute the very arbitrariness that the joint judgment 
seeks to avoid,74 or it can create it through a disconnect between the justification 
for detention and the decision-making surrounding it.75 Moreover, the Privy 
Council cases were actually concerned about the practical results of the 
relationship between mandatoriness and indefiniteness — namely, that the 
‘severity of the punishment’,76 was ‘effectively passed by the executive’.77 Such a 
thing, they felt, violated basic common law principles, merely reinforced by the 
relevant constitutional provisions regarding separation of powers.78 Australian 
constitutional law too, has long focused on a law’s practical effects in the 
circumstances as a whole. Moreover, since Wainohu v New South Wales, it has 
been recognised that the principle in Kable is not a rule that stands apart, but one 
that forms part of the interlocking web of constitutional principles that protects the 
fundamental nature of the relationship between the arms of government.79 
There is, thus, no longer any room to view the judicial process in isolation, 
nor to work on the basis of features rather than principles. Justice Gageler’s 
functional relational approach, incorporating the Lim principles, should be praised, 
but its ultimate conclusion is still open to criticism. Looking at the scheme as a 
whole, one sees that a person remains imprisoned because of a crime for which 
they are deemed responsible, not for any ‘therapeutic’ cause.80 In fact, in Moffatt, 
this was considered important to the validity of the legislation.81 Moreover, no 
																																																								
71 Ibid 650 [45]. 
72 Cf, eg, South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1, another important case applying Kable, where 
invalidity was founded partially on the basis of the scheme requiring a court to act to implement an 
executive decision. 
73 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 653–4 [62]–[65]. 
74 Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No 1629/2007, 98th sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/98/D/1629/2007, (26 March 2007, adopted 18 March 2010) (Fardon v Australia) 7.4(1). 
75 James v United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 1706, [194]. 
76 Hinds v DPP (Jamaica) [1977] AC 195, 226 (emphasis added). 
77 DPP (Jamaica) v Mollison [2003] 2 AC 411, 422 (emphasis added). 
78 Hinds v DPP (Jamaica) [1977] AC 195, 212–13; cited in DPP (Jamaica) v Mollison [2003] 2 AC 
411, 423–4. 
79 (2011) 243 CLR 181, 228 [105]. 
80 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 656–7 [71]–[73]. 
81 Moffatt [1998] 2 VR 229, 238–9, 260. This case was a direct challenge to the possibility of 
indefinite detention at the time of sentence based on Kable, which failed at intermediate court level. 
2015] CASE NOTE: POLLENTINE v BLEIJIE 565 
legal or practical arrangements exist to ensure rehabilitation, which is a hallmark of 
preventative therapeutic detention.82 
V An Alternative 
The High Court could have found this to be a classic case of judicial criminal 
sentencing, with legislative empowerment of prevention beyond proportionality.83 
This would have had the advantage of avoiding the uneasy middle ground between 
unfitness, insanity and punishment that is appealed to in this, and other, 
preventative detention schemes.84 It would also open the window to the solution 
used by the Privy Council, namely, replacing the executive’s pleasure with ‘the 
court’s pleasure’.85 The latter description could probably apply to all but two of the 
current systems for indefinite sentencing in Australia, including the system 
considered in the main post-Kable case of Moffatt.86 Moffatt and Fardon both 
noted the irony that a Kable challenge to indefinite detention needed to be rooted 
in the involvement of the courts, the branch of government most able to protect 
someone’s rights.87 However, whether this is truly the case depends upon one’s 
approach. The effect of a court on its integrity occurs in its immediate institutional 
context when a features-based approach is taken. However, the principles traceable 
to Lim are fundamentally based in the ultimate effects of the separation of powers 
on common law rights. Evaluating the real effects of a court’s actions in light of 
the relationship between those powers would engage with the principled roots of 
Kable, removing the need for obfuscatory fictions, and providing a more logical 
and humane system. 
VI Conclusion 
The decision in Pollentine v Bleijie represents a missed opportunity. An important 
human right and a complex constitutional principle were brought together by the 
circumstances of the case. By taking a more holistic and principled approach, the 
High Court could have given real power to its repeated warnings about the need for 
care in infringing that right.88 Instead, a fragmented approach avoided engaging 
with the issues. This failure leaves it uncertain whether other indefinite detention 
statutes will be interpreted as providing for broad executive power, but probable 
that legislatures will be tempted to reduce reliance upon the courts. 
																																																																																																																																
The scheme in question is found in the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 18A–18P and includes 
mandatory regular court reviews. 
82 James v United Kingdom [2012] ECHR 1706, [194]. 
83 For a summary of the law on the relationship between proportionality, common law, legislation and 
sentencing in this context, see Moffatt [1998] 2 VR 229, 234–6, 251–2. 
84 Pollentine v Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 646 [30]; cf Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 98(2)(c)(i). 
85 DPP (Jamaica) v Mollison [2003] 2 AC 411. 
86 Moffatt [1998] 2 VR 229. 
87 Fardon (2004) 223 CLR 575, 586; Moffatt [1998] 2 VR 229, 260. 
88 Cases in which such warnings have been given were listed in the joint judgment in Pollentine v 
Bleijie (2014) 253 CLR 629, 643–4 [22]. 
